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STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION-1956 TENNESSEE SURVEY
PAUL J. HARTMAN*
As indicative of the growing importance to the bench and bar of
state and local taxation, the Tennessee Supreme Court was called
upon to decide three significant tax cases during the period covered
by this survey article. During this period, objecting taxpayers spear-
headed vigorous assaults against various privilege taxes on commerce
and due process clause grounds.
The Commerce Clause and the States' Power to Levy Taxes
in Connection with the Transportation of Natural Gas and Oil
In Tennessee Natural Gas Lines v. Atkins' the Tennessee Supreme
Court sustained, over commerce clause objections, a Tennessee gross
receipts tax as applied to the receipts from the sale of gas transmitted
from an out-of-state source of supply, but bought by taxpayer in the
State, and delivered to a local consumer by the taxpayer. The taxpayer
(Tennessee Natural Gas Lines), a Tennessee corporation operating
entirely within the state, bought natural gas from an interstate
pipeline company (Tennessee Gas Transmission Company) and re-
sold the taxed portion of the gas to a large industrial user (Dupont
Company) in the state. This gas sold to Dupont was delivered to
that consumer from a metering station which taxpayer maintained
on Dupont's premises, where the pressure was reduced for the pur-
pose of delivering the gas to Dupont for consumption. Gas was also
delivered by taxpayer to wholly owned subsidiary corporations,
which, in turn, sold the gas to consumers within the state. The
taxing authority of Tennessee did not seek to tax the proceeds of
the sale of gas by taxpayer to these subsidiary corporations. Ten-
nessee applied her gross receipts tax only to the proceeds of the gas
sold to Dupont for consumption within the state. Taxpayer-distributor
resisted the tax on the gas sold to Dupont on commerce clause grounds
upon the theory that the taxed proceeds were from a sale that was
an integral segment of interstate commerce and therefore immune
from the tax. Taxpayer took the position that since the gas originated
in Texas and Louisiana and flowed without interruption through
these states into Tennessee and came to rest at the plant of the con-
sumer, Dupont, that the whole process was exclusively interstate
commerce.
The Court rejected taxpayer's contention and concluded that the
interstate transmission of the gas ended when it was purchased in
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University; member, Tennessee Bar.
1. 287 S.W.2d 67 (Tenn. 1956).
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Tennessee by the taxpayer for resale to the local consumer. The
Court then held that taxpayer's business of supplying the local
consumer constituted taxable local business even though the gas was
brought from another state and drawn for distribution directly from
interstate pipelines.
The case at hand properly raises for consideration the broader ques-
tion of when does the commerce clause immunize from various excise
taxes gas (and oil) that has crossed state borders in pipelines.
Privilege Taxes on Transportation of Oil and Gas: In the field of
transportation of oil and gas, the Supreme Court of the United States
drew the line, in part, several years ago between valid and invalid
taxation of the privilege of transportation of those commodities. It
did so in United Fuel Gas Co. v. Hallanan,2 and Eureka Pipe Line Co.
v. Hallanan,3 involving respectively natural gas and oil. In those two
cases the taxpayers questioned, on commerce clause grounds, a West
Virginia tax on the transmission of gas and oil in pipe lines within
the taxing state. The ultimate destination of the great bulk of both
commodities was beyond the borders of the taxing state, but the oil
and gas transported by the taxed carriers -were produced within the
taxing state. The questioned West Virginia statute prohibited en-
gaging in the business of transporting oil and gas without the pay-
ment of a tax for the privilege of so doing. The taxpayers apparently
were not producers of oil and gas, and most of the commodities were
gathered or purchased within the taxing state. The oil and gas were
carried either by pipelines of the taxpayers or those of connecting
companies to whom much of the gas and oil was sold. The taxed
pipeline companies conceded the taxability of the gas and oil to the
extent that it was gathered in the taxing state and distributed to in-
state purchasers who were engaged in the refining business. The
controversy hinged on the application of the tax statute to the quan-
tity of the commodity which came from within the taxing state and
was matched by the same quantity which was withdrawn from the
pipelines at points beyond the state.
In striking down the tax in both cases, the Court held that the test
of ultimate destination of the product was determinative of whether
the transportation was taxable local business, or interstate commerce
that was free from such taxes. The whole of the transportation with
respect to that part of the oil and gas which ultimately moved out
of the state was held to constitute interstate commerce and beyond
reach of the taxing power of the state insofar as the privilege tax
was concerned. These two cases seemed to make it clear that a
state has no power, consistent with the commerce clause, to impose
2. 257 U.S. 277 (1921).
3. 257 U.S. 265 (1921).
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a tax on the privilege of transporting oil and gas where the ultimate
destination of the transported products lies beyond the borders of the
taxing state, even though the taxed transportation activities carry
oil and gas produced within the taxing state.
A decade after the United Fuel Gas and Eureka Pipe Line decisions,
there came before the Supreme Court of the United States a Mis-
sissippi privilege tax statute as applied to a pipeline company which
brought gas into the state and delivered it to another pipeline com-
pany, which distributed the gas to consumers. The tax, as applied,
was resisted on commerce clause grounds in State Tax Commission v.
Interstate Natural Gas Co. 4 The objecting taxpayer owned a trunk
line of pipes through which it carried gas from the gas fields in
Louisiana into Mississippi and back into Louisiana. Taxpayer's trunk
line in Mississippi was tapped by distributing companies and de-
liveries were made by taxpayer to those distributors. These deliveries
to distributors by taxpayer were the incidence of the tax levied for
the privilege of doing business. The amount of gas delivered to the
distributors was measured by a thermometer and a meter furnished
by taxpayer, and the pressure of the gas was reduced before it passed
into the hands of the distributors. As applied to taxpayer, the tax
was upset as repugnant to the commerce clause. Neither the reduc-
tion of the pressure by taxpayer nor the measuring of the gas was
thought by the Court to constitute local, taxable business. The work
done by taxpayer upon the flowing gas was to help delivery, thought
Justice Holmes, who spoke for the Court; and as such, the work was
plainly incident to the interstate transmission of the gas. The nub of the
matter is succinctly stated by Justice Holmes when he declared that,
"The plaintiff [objecting taxpayer] simply transports gas and de-
livers it wholesale not otherwise worked over than to make it ready
for delivery to independent parties that dispose of it by retail."5 In
passing, it is significant to note that the Court emphasized that the
reduction in pressure was not for delivery to consumers as a local
business but was merely incident to the convenient delivery by tax-
payer to the wholesale distributing company which, in turn, would
make resale to consumers.
6
A local privilege tax upon a pipeline transportation company, where
taxpayer delivered gas directly to the consumers, was before the
Supreme Court of the United States in Southern Natural Gas Corp.
v. Alabama.7 This called into commerce clause judgment an Alabama
tax imposed upon foreign corporations doing business in the state.
4. 284 U.S. 41 (1931).
5. Id. at 44.
6. Cf. Texas Gas Transmission Corp. v. Atkins, 197 Tenn. 123, 270 S.W.2d
384 "(1954), where delivery to a distributor was thought to be interstate com-
merce, but the tax was upheld on another ground.
7. 301 U.S. 148 (1937).
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This annual franchise tax was measured by the capital employed in
the state. The questioned tax was applied to a Delaware corporation
(taxpayer), which was qualified to do business in Alabama and which
maintained its commercial domicile there. Taxpayer was engaged
in the business of purchasing natural gas in Louisiana and Mississippi
gas fields, transporting it through its pipeline system into Alabama,
and selling it in Alabama and other states. The gas moved con-
tinuously from the extra-state gas fields under natural pressure to
the points of delivery. Of the gas delivered in Alabama, part of it
went under full pressure to distributors, and the rest was sold for
consumption to industrial plants after the pressure of the gas had
been reduced. The controversy over the tax actually concerned only
the gas delivered by taxpayer to consumers in Alabama. The Court
did not pass upon the validity of the tax as applied to the sales at full
pressure to the distributors since the tax could be sustained if the
Court found that taxpayer engaged in some local business.
The Court concluded that the taxpayer was not engaged exclusively
in interstate commerce and sustained the tax over commerce clause
objections. Taxpayer's operating and financial headquarters within
the taxing state may have been enough to sustain the tax. Neverthe-
less, the Court's opinion seems to make it clear that the sales to the
consuming industrial plants within the taxing state, after reducing the
gas pressure, constituted taxable local activity.
Thus, under the rationale of this case the state can tax the first
sale or delivery of gas brought in from an extra-state source, if the sale
is also the last sale because delivered to the consumer. Such a sale or
delivery is a local event which can serve as the incidence of a privilege
tax in connection with the transportation of gas. However, as we saw
in connection with the Interstate Natural Gas case, it is not consti-
tutionally competent for the states to tax the first sale in the state if
it is to a distributing company which, in turn, resells the gas, even
though taxpayer reduces the pressure of the gas and meters it before
delivery into the purchaser's pipes. There the activity is treated
simply in furtherance of additional interstate transportation opera-
tions and is not a taxable local privilege. Moreover, under the United
Fuel Gas and Eureka Pipe Line cases, we saw that there is no sufficient
localism to support a privilege tax on the transportation of oil and gas
intended for an out-of-state destination even though the oil and gas
were produced within the state where the taxed transportation
operated.
A pipeline company may, of course, transport gas and oil through
a state in its own pipelines either without acquiring the product within
the state, or without making any sales or deliveries in the state,
either to consumers or to connecting distributors. That was the
19561 1119
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situation in Ozark Pipe Line Corp. v. Monier,8 which involved a
Missouri tax as applied to a Maryland corporation operating a pipe-
line extending from Oklahoma through Missouri to a destination in
Illinois. Missouri undertook to apply her privilege tax to taxpayer
for the privilege of doing business within the state. This taxed pipe-
line company had within Missouri more than half of its property,
including its main office, pipelines, and appurtenances used to transport
oil. It had qualified as a foreign corporation to do local business and
was granted the power to exercise the right of eminent domain. It
also did other things in connection with its business. However, oil was
neither received nor delivered in the taxing state. All its property and
activities were thought by the Court to be the means and instrumen-
talities used to conduct a business that was exclusively interstate
commerce. Having concluded that all that was done within the
state was in furtherance of the transportation operation that was
solely interstate, the Court held the tax inimical to the commerce
clause as a tax upon the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce.
Justice Brandeis dissented vigorously from the Ozark Pipe Line de-
cision on the grounds that the incidence of the tax was the privilege of
carrying on business in corporate form, with the corporation's main
place of business and much property within the state, and with the
grant to the corporation of the power to exercise for its purposes the
right of eminent domain. This business which this foreign corpora-
tion sought leave to do in corporate form, Justice Brandeis thought,
was local as well as interstate. Justice Brandeis pointed out that
there was no claim that the questioned tax discriminated against in-
terstate commerce; and he concluded that the state must either give up
its franchise tax or discriminate against its own local business which
must be saddled with the tax.
Although Missouri was denied the constitutional power to tax
the pipeline company for the privilege of doing business under the
statute as there drafted and applied, it does appear that the company
did engage in activities within Missouri which could have been used
to support a valid privilege tax. Not only did the pipeline company
have within Missouri more than half of its property, its principal
offices, its bank accounts, and payrolls, but in addition it purchased
supplies, employed labor, maintained telegraph lines, made its con-
tracts for the sale of oil; it was qualified to do local business, was
granted power to exercise the right of eminent domain, and main-
tained three pumping stations to accelerate the propulsion of the
oil through the pipelines.
By careful statutory draftsmanship it would seem that a valid
privilege tax could be drafted by Missouri and states similarly situ-
8. 266 U.S. 555 (1925).
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ated. Had Missouri singled out some of those various means and in-
strumentalities used to transport the oil interstate, instead of ap-
plying her tax to the broad privilege of engaging in transportation,
the tax might well have warded off the commerce clause assault.
The activities of the pipeline company within Missouri were similar-
to those upon which other privilege taxes have been sustained. One
such activity was made the subject of a valid privilege tax in Cover-
dale v. Arkansas-Louisiana Pipe Line Co.9 There the Court sustained,
over commerce clause objections, a privilege.,,tax as applied to the
production of the mechanical power (the compressor stations) used
to propel gas through an interstate pipeline. Although the com-
pressor stations appear to be indispensable to the interstate gas
business (since gas would not flow through the pipes without the
compression), nevertheless the Court was of the opinion that the
stations were local activities, separate and apart from interstate com-
merce.
Also, in Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone,10 involving a Mississippi
statute, the Court upheld over commerce clause objections, a privilege
tax as applied to the activities of "maintaining, keeping in repair and
otherwise in managing" the pipeline facilities used in transporting
gas through the state, although the taxpaying pipeline company was
engaged exclusively in interstate transportation of gas. The Mississippi
tax was measured by all the capital employed within the state.
Ozark Pipe Lines engaged in activity within Missouri which would
seem to support a privilege tax patterned after that sustained in
Memphis Natural Gas. Moreover, in Memphis Natural Gas the Court
expressly limited Ozark Pipe Line Corp. v. Monier to a tax "upon
the privilege or right to do business" and said that if Ozark Pipe Line
Corp. v. Monier held that the in-state activities could not be taxed,
it disagreed with the conclusion." The rationale of these two cases,
Coverdale and Memphis Natural Gas, would seem to support the
proposition that the states may constitutionally impose privilege taxes
on the means and instrumentalities indispensable to the transporta-
tion of oil and gas in interstate channels, even though the taxpayer
is engaged exclusively in interstate commerce. While taxes on, the
privilege of engaging in transportation in these two cases ostensibly
would have been banned, yet these privileges closely connected with
the interstate transportation were regarded as distinct from the
transportation for purposes of taxation.
12
9. 303 U.S. 604 (1938).
10. 335 U.S. 80 (1948).
11. Id. at 94.
12. Likewise -property taxes on means and instrumentalities used to -carry-
on interstate commerce are valid. See, e.g., Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minne-
sota, 322 U.S. 292 (1944). The writer has elsewhere made a much fuller dis-
cussion of property taxes on such property. -See HARTMAN;t STATE TAXATIOR
OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE 122-79 (1953).
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The decisions examined thus far make it clear that where the in-
cidence of the tax is attributable only to interstate pipeline transporta-
tion of oil and gas,13 as distinguished from some "local" event closely
related to the transportation, 14 or as distinguished from the local
activity of delivery to consumers,15 the tax has been declared a burden
forbidden by the commerce clause.
The latest pronouncement by the Supreme Court of the United
States dealing with the impact of the commerce clause on a tax
levied in connection with the interstate transportation of gas is
Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. Calvert.16 There the controversy
was whether a Texas tax as applied had as its incidence an activity
attributable to a judicially recognized, taxable local event or whether
the incidence was solely attributable to interstate transportation
of gas.
The questioned statute imposed upon every person engaged in
gathering gas an occupation tax for the privilege of engaging in such
business, measured by the volume of gas gathered. The statutory
definition of the term "gathering" became crucial to the decision. As
to this definition, the statute provided that "in the case of gas con-
taining gasoline or liquid hydrocarbons that are removed or ex-
tracted at a point within the State by scrubbing, absorption, com-
pression or any other process, the term 'gathering gas' means the
first taking or the first retaining of possession of such gas for other
processing or transmission, whether through a pipeline, either com-
mon carrier or private, or otherwise after such gas has passed through
the outlet of such plant." The statute prohibited the "gatherer" as
therein defined from shifting the burden of the tax to the producer of
the gas. The objecting taxpayer neither produced nor sold gas in
Texas. All of its gas was bought from a Texas producer. The gas
involved was produced, collected from the well-heads by the producer,
and piped into a gasoline plant where certain liquefiable hydrocar-
bons, oxygen, sulphur, hydrogen sulphide, dust and foreign substances
were removed preparatory to the transmission of the gas. After the
dry gas had passed through producer's separation plant, it then flowed
through producer's pipes for a short distance where it was delivered
to taxpayer's pipeline at the outlet of the plant. The gas then con-
tinued to move in a constant flow to a compressor station owned and
operated by taxpayer, at which station the pressure of the gas was
raised to facilitate movement to distant extra-state markets. The
taxed event, as found by the Texas court, was the "taking or retain-
ing of the gas at the gasoline plant outlet." The Texas court upheld
13. See textual material supported by cases in notes 2, 3, 4, and 8 supra.
14. See textual material supported by cases in notes 9 and 10 supra.
15. See textual material supported by note 7 supra.
16. 347 U.S. 157 (1954).
1122 [ VOL. 9
STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION
the tax statute as thus applied since it was of the opinion that the
incidence of the tax was a local event and the tax was not subject to
repetition elsewhere.
The Supreme Court of the United States agreed with the Texas
tribunal as to the incidence of the tax but declared that the statute
had delayed the incidence of the tax beyond the step where produc-
tion and processing had ceased and transmission in interstate com-
merce had begun.'7 Calling the statutory definition of the term "gath-
ering gas" a "beggared definition,"' 8 the Court observed that taxpayer
obviously was not engaged in "gathering gas" within the meaning of
that term in its ordinary usage and that the tax statute gave the
term a transcendent scope.19 The Court then concluded that the
incidence of the tax (gathering gas) occurred after the gas had been
produced, gathered, and processed by others than the taxpayer and
that the "gathering of the gas" was essentially a part of interstate
commerce itself.20
As a constitutional predicate for its decision, the Supreme Court
was of the opinion that it is "now well settled that a tax imposed on
a local activity related to interstate commerce is valid if, and only if,
the local activity is not such an integral part of the interstate process,
the flow of commerce, that it cannot realistically be separated from
it.
' '
21 Having thus reasoned, the Court held that the questioned tax
was a forbidden levy on interstate commerce itself. The privilege
taxed, namely the taking of the gas, was not so separate and distinct
from interstate transportation as to support the tax.
The Texas statute as applied in the Calvert case was not incident
to the local activities of production and processing, preceding the
entry of the gas into the interstate transportation system. Rather,
the tax appears to bear directly on activities that are solely at-
tributable to the interstate transportation of the gas. As such, the
case is in line with earlier cases that struck down taxes on activities
attributable solely to the interstate transportation itself.2
Although Texas was rebuffed in the Calvert case, nevertheless, by a
change in legislative drafting, Texas should be able to harvest revenue
from the various activities of this pipeline company. Perhaps the
Supreme Court of the United States might put its stamp of constitu-
tional approval on certain legislatively designated local events in
connection with the processing of the gas in extracting the liquid
17. Id. at 166.
18. Id. at 161.
19. Id. at 164.
20. Id. at 167.
21. Id. at 166.
22. State Tax Comm'n v. Interstate Natural Gas Co., 284 U.S. 41 (1931);
Ozark Pipe Line Corp. v. Monier, 266 U.S. 555 (1925); United Fuel Gas Co.
v. Hallanan, 257 U.S. 277 (1921); Eureka Pipe Line Co. v. Hallanan, 257 U.S.
265 (1921); all of which cases we have examined herein.
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hydrocarbons, or removal of such substances as water, sulphur, dust,
foreign substances, etc., at the scrubber or dehydration plants.23
Likewise, the legislature might be successful in finding taxable local
events in connection with gathering the gas from the wells.&2 4 Con-
stitutionality might be achieved even in connection with the purchase
of the gas by the pipeline company, as distinguished from the Texas
statutorily defined event of "gathering" gas.2 Such tax, of course,
favors those producers who transport their own gas from their own
wells. However, all the mentioned activities appear to be local pur-
suits attributable only to production, processing, and collecting gas
and are prefatory to interstate transportation of the gas. It is sound
constitutional gospel, of course, that the fact that goods are being manu-
factured, processed or prepared for transportation in interstate chan-
nels has not exempted from various sorts of privilege taxes either
the activities of producing or preparing of the articles themselves,
or those who produced or otherwise processed or prepared the article
for interstate passage.26 Moreover, there ought to be sufficient localism
in the operation of the gas compressors, under previous authority, to
support a tax for the privilege of operating them.2 7 Also, we just saw
that Mississippi got her privilege tax on interstate transportation of
gas over the commerce clause hurdle by applying the tax to the
privilege of "maintaining, keeping in repair and otherwise in man-
aging" the pipeline facilities used to transport the gas through the
state.2
8
Sales Taxes as Applied to Transportation of Gas and Oil: A con-
venient way of deriving revenue from the oil and gas industry is
through the imposition of a tax on gross receipts derived either from
the sale of the oil and gas or derived from the sale of services in con-
nection with transporting these commodities. Generically speaking,
sales taxes, as here treated, are a species of privilege tax and could
23. Cf. Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U.S. 245 (1922) (processing coal
for market).
24. See Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. Calvert, 347 U.S. 157, 166-67
(1954).
25. In International Harvester Co. v. Department of Treasury, 322 U.S.
340 (1944), sales contracts made within the taxing state for the sale of
goods to go into interstate commerce were held to be taxable sales.
26. See, e.g., Chassaniol v. City of Greenwood, 291 U.S. 584 (1934) (occu-
pation tax on buying and selling cotton locally produced, processed, and
warehoused after it had been ginned, upheld); Federal Compress & Ware-
house Co. v. McLean, 291 U.S. 17 (1934) (license tax levied on privilege of
operating a cotton compress and warehouse, sustained, although interstate
commerce followed); Utah Power & Light Co. v. Pfost, 286 U.S. 165 (1932)
(license tax on manufacture, generation or production of electricity trans-
mitted instantaneously in interstate commerce, held valid); Hope Natural
Gas Co. v. Hall, 274 U.S. 284 (1927) (privilege tax on production of gas sold
interstate, sustained); Oliver Iron Mining Co. v. Lord, 262 U.S. 172 (1923)
(occupation tax on mining ores, held valid).
27. See textual material supported by note 9 supra.
28. See textual material supported by note 10 supra.
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properly have been considered under the preceding heading dealing
with privilege taxes as such. Purely for convenience in discussion,
however, sales taxes have here been put in this separate category.
As we have just had occasion to observe, mining, manufacturing and
production have been treated by the Supreme Court of the United
States as purely local pursuits, and interstate commerce does not
begin until the articles start their final movement for transportation
from the state of production to that of their destination. Such' was
the reasoning evolved by the Court at an early date as a criterion
for determining tax validity under the commerce clause. As long
as there was a perceptible pause or break between production and
transportation, there was no judicial difficulty in applying this test
of constitutionality; but modern business does not necessarily accom-
modate itself to the convenience of the mental processes of the
judiciary. We find this illustrated in the first case involving a priv-
ilege tax, measured by gross receipts from sales, as applied to the
production of gas. In Hope Natural Gas Co. v. Hall,29 the Supreme
Court of the United States had before it a West Virginia occupation
tax upon the business of producing natural gas and other named
resources, the tax being measured by the gross proceeds from the
sale irrespective of the place of sale. Most of the product of the tax-
payer moved directly from the producing wells in West Virginia into
Ohio and Pennsylvania where it was consumed.
Where gas is released from the producing wells in one state and is
transmitted in a continuous movement to the burner-tips in another
state by a single operation of opening a valve or turning a gas jet in
the latter state, it is not possible to mark, in any satisfactory or realis-
tic manner, the dividing line between production and interstate trans-
portation so as to conform to prior patterns of judicial reasoning. In
the Hope Natural Gas case the taxpayer ostensibly assumed that
there could be valid state taxation of the value of the gas at the well.
The only objection to which the Court addressed itself was the use of
gross receipts from extra-state sales as a factor in fixing that value.
The Supreme Court of the United States accepted the state court's
interpretation of the West Virginia statute as being applicable to
the value of the gas within the state and before it entered interstate
commerce, and that the gross proceeds from sales in another state
were only to be taken into account for finding that value. Accept-
ing this interpretation of the highest state tribunal, our highest fedetal
tribunal sustained the Hope Natural Gas tax. Gross receipts from
extra-state sales of the gas were thus properly used, thought the
Court, to fix the value of the gas produced at the well for tax pur-
poses.
29. 274 U.S. 284 (1927).
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In the Hope Natural Gas case the gross proceeds from the inter-
state sale of gas were taxed by the state of production. In East Ohio
Gas Co. v. Tax Commission,30 the taxpayer (East Ohio Gas) resisted
a tax imposed by the state of the consumer on gross receipts from
sales of gas by the taxed pipeline company to consumers.
For all practical purposes, this case is about the same situation as
that in the Tennessee case of Tennessee Natural Gas Lines v. Atkins,31
which is the subject of this comment.
,In the East Ohio Gas case an Ohio excise for the privilege of
engaging in business was applied to a pipeline company distributing
gas to consumers. A percentage of the gross receipts from sales in
local business was the legislatively designated measure of the tax.
The issue in the case was the determination of what business could
properly be included in the measure of the tax. East Ohio (tax-
payer) obtained three-fourths of its supply of gas from West Virginia
and Pennsylvania and one-fourth in Ohio. This taxed distributor
furnished to some customers gas exclusively from outside the tax-
ing state, to some only gas from Ohio, and to other customers a mix-
ture of that originating within and without the state. The crux of
the controversy had to do only with the tax on the receipts from cus-
tomers receiving gas only from wells outside the taxing state. Tax-
payer purchased this gas from producing and carrying companies at
the state line. The tax was challenged on commerce clause grounds,
but was sustained by the Supreme Court of the United States. This
furnishing of gas at wholesale to this distributor-taxpayer was de-
clared by the Court to constitute interstate commerce, but the Court
held that interstate commerce ended when the gas was delivered to
taxpayer. The reduction of gas pressure by passing through reducing
stations and the division into many relatively tiny streams that en-
tered the small service lines for delivery by taxpayer to consumers
were said by the Court to be like the breaking of an original pack-
age, after shipment in interstate commerce, in order that its contents
may be treated, prepared for sale, and sold at retail. The Court con-
cluded, therefore, that this whole process of furnishing gas by tax-
payer to consumers in the taxing state (the taxed sale) by means of
distribution plants did not constitute interstate commerce, but was
purely a local activity. With the interstate nature of the taxed
activity thus gone, there remained no commerce clause infirmity in
the tax imposed on the gross proceeds from the sale by the tax-
payer to the consumer.
In the essential commercial respects the East Ohio Gas case appears
to be like Tennessee Natural Gas Lines v. Atkins.32 Consequently, the
30. 283 U.S. 465 (1931).
31. 287 S.W.2d 67 (Tenn. 1956).
32. Ibid.
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Tennessee Supreme Court's decision upholding the Tennessee tax is in
line with this controlling decision of the Supreme Court of the
United States on the commerce clause point.
Although the United States Supreme Court appears to give weight
to the reduction of the pressure of the gas in sustaining the tax in
the East Ohio Gas case, it must not be thought that the reduction of
the pressure of gas is the touchstone to valid taxation insofar as
the commerce clause is concerned. In State Tax Commission v. In-
terstate Natural Gas Co.3 we saw that gas pressure was reduced
merely as an incident to the convenient delivery by the wholesale
distributing company (taxpayer) to another distributor who, in
turn, would resell the gas. There the delivery by the taxed wholesaler
to another distributor did not give the state a taxable grip. Neither
does the increasing of pressure to facilitate interstate propulsion of
gas through pipelines appear to be significant in determining the
constitutionality of a privilege tax on transporting gas across the
state lines, at least where the tax reaches the entire volume of gas.
That conclusion seems implicit in the language of Michigan-Wiscon-
sin Pipe Line Co. v. Calvert34 which held that the tax offended com-
merce clause requirements. So the real distinction between those
privilege taxes on transportation of gas which have been upheld and
those struck down can hardly be anything about manipulating the
pressure of the gas.
When a privilege tax in connection with the sale and transporta-
tion of gas and oil is opposed on commerce clause grounds, the
rationale of the cases thus far examined seems to be the formula-
tion of a judgment whether the incidence of the tax is attributable
to one or more of the judicially recognized, taxable local activities
in connection with the production and transportation of the com-
modity, on the one hand; or, on the other hand, is the incidence of
the tax attributable only to a taxfree operation of purely interstate
transportation. Thus, the Court has found sufficient localism for a
tax where the state of production has sought to reach an extra-
state sale by using the proceeds of the sale only to fix the value
of the privilege of production.35 Also, where the gas has been trans-
ported across the state lines coming into the taxing state, the de-
livery of the gas to consumers in the taxing state constitutes activity
that can constitutionally be used as the incidence of a tax.36 On the
33. 284U.S.41 (1931).
34. 347 U.S. 157 (1954). See textual material supported by notes 16 through
21 supra.
35. Hope Natural Gas Corp. v. Hall, 274 U.S. 284 (1927). See textual
material supported by note 29 supra.
36. Southern Natural Gas Corp. v. Alabama, 301 U.S. 148 (1937), dis-
cussed in connection with note 7 supra; and East Ohio Gas Co. v. Tax Comm'n,
283 U.S. 465 (1931), discussed in connection with note 30 supra'
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other side of the shield, taxes applied solely to the privilege of in-
terstate transportation are forbidden by the commerce clause. Such
taxes by the state of production will fall before a commerce clause
attack where the taxed transportation operation starts with the
initial step in a journey that has an extra-state destination; 37 and
such a privilege tax by the state of production is also proscribed by
the commerce clause when applied to transportation by a pipeline
carrier that has received the product from another after the out-of-
state movement already has begun. Also, these tax-immune inter-
state transportation operations extend to the transportation of gas
brought into the taxing state, where the taxed carrier simply de-
livers the product within the state only to another pipeline carrier,39
as distinguished from delivery by a transportation company to con-
sumers, which is taxable, local activity. Moreover, exclusively inter-
state transportation of oil (and presumably gas) that passes through
the taxing states, without deliveries of any sort, is beyond the con-
stitutional reach of the state insofar as taxes on the privilege of en-
gaging in that transportation are concerned. 40 Of course, there are
those valid privilege taxes applied to the privilege of using some
vehicle or instrumentality connected with interstate transportation,
even though indispendable to the transportation, but which the
Court treats as separate and distinct from the interstate commerce
for tax purposes.4
1
One rather late case does not fit into the rationale of the cases as
heretofore developed. That is Interstate Oil Pipe Line Co. v. Stone.42
There Mississippi had a statute levying a tax for the privilege of en-
gaging in business, measured by gross income. Mississippi applied
this tax to a pipeline company engaged in transporting oil. Taxpayer
transported oil from lease tanks in various fields in Mississippi to
loading racks adjacent to railroads elsewhere in the state. From
these racks the oil was pumped into railroad tank cars for shipment
to points outside the state. In the event no tank cars were available,
the oil was stored in tanks near the racks, but delays in loading
usually were of short duration and never exceeded a week. When
37. United Fuel Gas Co. v. Hallanan, 257 U.S. 277 (1921), and Eureka Pipe
Line Co. v. Hallanan, 257 U.S. 265 (1921), which are discussed in connection
with notes 2 and 3 supra.
38. Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. Calvert, 347 U.S. 157 (1954), dis-
cussed in connection with notes 16 through 21 supra.
39. State Tax Comm'n v. Interstate Natural Gas Co., 284 U.S. 41 (1931),
discussed in connection with note 4 supra.
40. Ozark Pipe Line Corp. v. Monier, 266 U.S. 555 (1925), discussed in
connection with note 8 supra.
41. Coverdale v. Arkansas-Louisiana Pipe Line Co., 303 U.S. 604 (1938)
(compressor stations), which is discussed in connection with note 9 supra;
and Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U.S. 80 (1948) (pipe lines in
ground), discussed in connection with note 10 supra.
42. 337 U.S. 662 (1949).
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the oil was delivered to taxpayer it was accompanied by shipping
orders from the producer or owner directing that the oil be transported
to out-of-state destinations. There was no through bill of lading from
the point of origin at the oil fields to the extra-state destinations.
Taxpayer was engaged solely in transporting oil that went exclu-
sively into interstate channels; no oil was sold in the taxing state.
The tax was construed to be on the privilege of operating the pipelines
with the gross proceeds from the transportation of the oil from the
lease tanks to the loading racks used to measure the amount of tax.
Taxpayer resisted the tax as an unconstitutional levy on the privi-
lege of engaging in interstate commerce.
The Supreme Court of the United States sustained the tax, with
four members of the majority of the Court voting to uphold it even
though the statute, as applied, levied a direct tax on the privilege of
engaging in interstate commerce. The fifth member of the majority
voted to sustain the tax on the ground that it was imposed on the
privilege of transporting oil in Mississippi in local commerce. There
was a strong dissent on the theory that the exaction was a forbidden
levy on the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce.
Since the taxpayer (Interstate Oil Pipe Line) was engaged solely
in transporting oil from a producer or owner to another connecting
carrier that would transport the oil to a destination beyond the borders
of the taxing state, the case does not fit into the commerce clause
pattern of the cases thus far examined. Taxpayer's activities were
not attributable to the taxable, local activity of production; neither
did it deliver oil within the state for the taxable purpose of consump-
tion. Although all taxpayer's operations took place within the taxing
state, yet taxpayer was only a segment in an interstate conduit em-
ployed exclusively in interstate transportation, so to speak. The in-
come from those transportation activities was the measure of the
tax. As we have just seen, prior to Interstate Pipe Line Co. v. Stone
privilege taxes on the transportation of oil and gas have been in-
terdicted where the incidence of the tax was attributable solely to in-
terstate transportation of those commodities.
As Interstate Oil Pipe Line Co. v. Stone actually stands, it is, how-
ever, of doubtful significance. While four members of the Court voted
to sustain the tax even though imposed directly on the privilege of
engaging in interstate commerce, later decisions by the Supreme
Court make it clear that such judicial thinking is no longer in vogue.
43
Moreover, not even a majority of the Court voted to uphold the tax
43. Later decisions of the Supreme Court make it clear that the Court
will make short shrift of a tax thought to be levied on the privilege of engaging
in interstate commerce. See, e.g., Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. Calvert,
347 U.S. 157 (1954); Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602
(1951); cf. Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Virginia, 347 U.S. 359 (1954).
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on that ground. Mr. Justice Burton voted to sustain the tax as one
levied on a local activity.
Much can be said in support of the view of those four members of
the Court who would uphold this Interstate Oil Pipe Line privilege
tax, even though levied directly on the privilege of engaging in inter-
state commerce. This view would require interstate commerce to
bear its share of the expenses of the government under whose pro-
tection it operated. Moreover, this view removes the inequities of
permitting interstate business to escape a tax with which local busi-
ness must be saddled, for local business is thereby placed at a com-
petitive disadvantage. Also, Mississippi tried to reach only her fair
share of revenue. She taxed only those receipts derived from trans-
portation operations within her borders. There was thus no danger
of including extra-state values in the reach of her tax. Neither could
any other state reach those values taxed by Mississippi; hence the
tax could not be repeated elsewhere so as to place interstate business
at a disadvantage with local business.
The Commerce Clause and the States' Power to Impose Privilege
Taxes on Multi-state Investment Companies
Tennessee also saw another of her tax statutes clear the commerce
clause hurdle, insofar as the Tennessee Supreme Court is concerned,
in Investors Syndicate of America, Inc. v. Allen.44 Two objecting tax-
payers, The Investors Syndicate of America and Investors Diversified
Services are engaged in the investment business. The latter corpora-
tion wholly owns the former and both are authorized to do business in
Tennessee. Both are foreign corporations. Diversified Services has
about 75 sales agents in Tennessee and it has sold and serviced large
amounts of investment certificates to the citizens of Tennessee. In-
vestors Syndicate, the subsidiary, had a contract with Diversified Serv-
ices, the parent, whereby Diversified Services sells the investment
certificates to the public for Investors Syndicate. The certificates are
issued by Investors Syndicate.
Both corporations challenged, on commerce clause grounds, a Ten-
nessee privilege tax levied against corporations, individuals and
partnerships engaged in writing, issuing, servicing and/or collecting
installments on investment contracts, whether such contracts are now
being issued or heretofore issued or collecting installments thereon.
The tax was measured by a percentage of the gross receipts of the busi-
ness. The tax statute also exempted the business of selling and servic-
ing investment certificates from all other taxes upon property owned
by such investment companies, including all other privilege taxes. Both
corporations claimed to be engaged exclusively in interstate com-
44. 279 S.W.2d 497 (Tenn. 1955).
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merce and thus not subject to the privilege tax. To buttress its position
that it was engaged exclusively in interstate commerce, Investors
Syndicate took the position that Diversified Services was an inde-
pendent contractor and was not Investors' agent. Therefore, Investors
concluded that since it was a foreign corporation it was engaged only
in an interstate business. The Tennessee Supreme Court, affirming
the lower court, first concluded that Diversified Services was, in fact,
the agent of Investors. Then, over the commerce clause objections,
the Court sustained the tax finding that both corporations were en-
gaged in local business, as well as in interstate business.
It is a well settled proposition of law that a foreign corporation en-
gaged only in soliciting business within a taxing state is engaged
exclusively in interstate commerce and neither the corporation nor the
soliciting agent is subject to any tax for the privilege of soliciting
business. The commerce clause bars the tax on both.45 That a state
may require payment of a tax for the privilege of engaging in a local
business or occupation, although mingled with interstate business, is
also a general proposition no longer within the arena of debate.4
Although a business concern does not, by engaging in local business,
forfeit its right to the protection of the commerce clause for its inter-
state business, it cannot channel business through a local outlet
to gain advantage of a local business and also retain for the local
business whatever immunity from taxation is furnished by the com-
merce clause to interstate business. So, the issue in the case at hand
is whether the corporations engage in some local business, or is every-
thing done by them only in furtherance of, or incidental to, a business
that is exclusively interstate?
Having first found that Investors Syndicate was operating through
its agent, Diversified Services, the Court then concluded that both
corporations did some local business, as well as interstate business.
Although the companies were not taking or receiving applications for
investment certificates at the time of the levy of the tax, that alone
did not render their business wholly interstate. Both corporations are
qualified to do business in Tennessee; their investment contracts are
being serviced, and the holders of the certificates are paying annually
to the parent, Diversified Services, approximately $2,000,000; and Di-
versified Services had large amounts of money on deposit in the
banks in the state. The Court was of the opinion that all these activi-
ties amounted to the doing of some taxable, local business.
The measure of the privilege tax in the case at hand is the familiar
45. Norton Co. v. Department of Revenue, 340 U.S. 534 (1951); Nippert v.
City of Richmond, 327 U.S. 416 (1946); Best & Co. v. Maxwell, 311 U.S. 454
(1940); Cheney Bros. Co. v. Massachusetts, 246 U.S. 147 (1918).
46. Chicago v. Willett Co., 344 U.S. 574 (1953); Norton Co. v. Department of




one of using the gross receipts from the business. The Supreme Court
of the United States, in passing on the constitutionality of a tax in-
volving gross receipts, has often drawn an artificial distinction be-
tween taxes levied directly "on" gross receipts, and a tax "measured
by" gross receipts, the latter having a much better chance of with-
standing an attack on commerce clause grounds.47 Also, the tax in
the case at hand was levied in lieu of all other taxes. Even during
much of our constitutional history when the Supreme Court has looked
with distinct disfavor upon taxes involving gross receipts from inter-
state transactions, a tax involving gross receipts levied "in lieu of"
all other taxes became a familiar and sanctioned tax.48
In sustaining the tax in the Investors Case, the Tennessee Court
lays considerable stress on the fact that these two foreign corpora-
tions had qualified to do business in Tennessee. Under prior controlling
decisions of the United States Supreme Court there is some doubt
that this grant by the state could alone be used to support a valid
privilege tax, if it be found that the business actually done was, in
fact, only interstate commerce.49 Moreover, if this case were to reach
the Supreme Court of the United States, that Court will make its
own independent decision as to whether the business done was wholly
interstate.50
There is no doubt in the writer's mind that Tennessee should be
able to exact this charge for the support of the state government under
whose protection these corporations operate. Unfortunately, however,
if a higher tribunal were to find that all that was done in Tennessee
was in furtherance of a business that is exclusively interstate, then
these foreign corporations perhaps could not, consistent with present
views on the commerce clause, be made to bear their fair share of the
cost of the government of Tennessee by paying this tax.5 '
47. The writer has undertaken elsewhere to give a much fuller treatment
of these various facets of the "gross receipts tax." See HARTMAN, STATE TAXA-
TION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE 180-214 (1953) (particularly 180-88).
48. Great Northern Ry. v. Minnesota, 278 U.S. 503 (1929); Pullman Co. v.
Richardson, 261 U.S. 330 (1923); Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co. v.
Wisconsin, 247 U.S. 132 (1918); United States Express Co. v. Minnesota, 223
U.S. 335 (1912).
49. Anglo-Chilean Nitrate Sales Corp. v. Alabama, 288 U.S. 218 (1933).
50. The Supreme Court will review the question of whether the state
court erroneously classified the commerce as local when, in fact it was inter-
state. Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. Calvert, 347 U.9. 157 (1954);
Central Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Mealey, 334 U.S. 653 (1948); Eureka Pipe
Line Co. v. Hallanan, 257 U.S. 265 (1921). However, the taxpayer claiming
the immunity under the commerce clause is said to have the burden of
establishing his exemption from the tax. Chicago v. Willett Co. 344 U.S. 574
(1953); Norton Co. v. Department of Revenue, 340 U.S. 534 ?1951).
51. Ozark Pipe Line Corp. v. Monier, 266 U.S. 555 (1925); cf. Spector Motor
Service, Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951) (tax measured by net income
struck down where business was exclusively interstate). The Ozark Pipe Line
case is treated in considerable detail in the text supported by notes 8 through
12 supra.
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The Impact of the Due Process Clause on Excise Taxes on a Foreign
Corporation Doing a Multi-State Business.
Tennessee's corporate excise tax measured by net earifings was
challenged on due process grounds in W. S. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co. v.
Dickinson.5 2 The objecting taxpayer was W. S. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co.,
a Delaware corporation, with general offices in Missouri but manu-
facturing glazed clay sewer pipe and allied clay products with five
plants in four states, including a plant in Tennessee. The principal
point in the case was whether the statutory tax formula for computing
net earnings should be based on a percentage of the combined earnings
of all five plants, or whether the tax should be applied only to the
earnings of taxpayer's plant in Tennessee. A second question was, as-
suming that all five plants should be used, should a so-called "hard-
ship" formula be used rather than the regular statutory formula.
The gist of taxpayer's due process objections was that its business
is multiform and that the tax should have been computed only on the
earnings of the Tennessee plant, whereas the lower court ruled that
the business was unitary in character and that the tax should be
based on a percentage of the net annual earnings of all the five plants,
although some were located in other states. Taxpayer contended that
the earnings so taxed from the extra-state plants were neither derived
from, nor reasonably attributable to, business done in Tennessee.
The excise tax in question was measured by a percentage of corporate
net earnings from business done within the state. The Tennessee ap-
portionment formula for determining the amount of taxpayer's net
earnings allocable to Tennessee is the ratio obtained by taking the
arithmetical average of the ratio of the value of three factors: (a)
taxpayer's real estate and tangible personal property in Tennessee
to the value of the taxpayer's entire real estate and tangible personal
property; (b) the ratio of the total cost of manufacturing, etc., within
the state to the total cost of manufacturing, etc., within and with-
out the sate; (c) the ratio of the gross sales to customers in Tennessee
to the total gross sales from all sources.
5 3
Over the due process clause objections, the Supreme Court of Ten-
nessee sustained the tax based on this three-factor formula, holding
that taxpayer's entire business in all four states was unitary and that
the tax should be computed on that basis. Also, the Court found no
basis for applying the "hardship" formula which is provided for in
the event unusual circumstances warrant using some other formula.5 4
In sweeping language the Supreme Court of the United States has
laid down a due process clause limitation on state taxing powers,
declaring that a "state may not tax real property or tangible personal
52. 289 S.W.2d 533 (Tenn. 1956).
53. TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-2707 (1956).
54. TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-2711 (1956).
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property lying outside her borders; nor may she lay an excise or
privilege tax upon the exercise or enjoyment of a right or privilege
in another state derived from the laws of that state and therein ex-
ercised and enjoyed. 55 Stated more affirmatively, due process is
concerned with whether a tax in practical operation has relation to
opportunities, benefits, or protection conferred or afforded by the
taxing state.5 6
When a state imposes a tax upon the net income of a foreign cor-
poration engaged in multi-state business, the Court has made it clear
that the tax can withstand the impact of the due process clause if the
tax reaches only that portion of the corporation's total net income
which is attributable to sources within the state.57 When a corporation
carries on business both within and without the taxing state, a tax
on net profits is valid, although such profits may have been obtained
in part from interstate transactions, provided that the intrastate
portion thereof is ascertained by apportionment.5 8 Moreover, the
Court recognizes that the value of the privilege of doing a local busi-
ness is increased for tax purposes, by the use of property beyond the
taxing state. The in-state property of such multi-state corporations
does have a real intangible value above its physical worth owing to its
use as part of one entire enterprise.5 9
When a corporation carries on business in several states, and if the
operations are not closely allied, the business may be divided among
the individual states for tax purposes by the separate accounting
method. Taxpayer contended that such separate accounting method
should have been used in the case at hand. On the other hand, if a
business within each state is integrated with the business in other
states, the separate accounting method need not be used. The entire
business income from all states may then be apportioned among the
relevant states on the basis of factors that produce the income.6 0 The
difficulty of making an exact apportionment is readily apparent in
a far-flung, multi-state business enterprise, and hence the applica-
tion of the formula for apportionment of the income to the taxing
state will withstand a due process clause assault unless it produces
an unreasonable and arbitrary result in a particular case. In a great
number of decisions the Supreme Court of the United States has up-
55. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Grosjean, 301 U.S. 412, 424 (1936).
56. See Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., 336 U.S. 169, 174 (1949);
Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940).
57. See, e.g., Bass, Ratcliff & Gretton, Ltd. v. State Tax Comm'n, 266 U.S.
271 (1924) (foreign commerce); Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain,
254 U.S. 113 (1920).
58. Matson Navigation Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 297 U.S. 441 (1936);
Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113 (1920).
59. International Harvester Co. v. Evatt, 329 U.S. 416 (1947); Ford Motor
Co. v. Beauchamp, 308 U.S. 331 (1939).
60. For discussion of the problem, see Silverstein, Problems of Apportion-
ment in Taxation of Multistate Business, 4 TAX L. REv. 207 (1949).
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held tax apportionment formulas, over due process and commerce
clause objections, where multi-state businesses have been taxed, not-
withstanding the fact that the various taxing jurisdictions have not
reached agreement on the factors that should go into this fiscal formula
and in spite of the fact that inequities may be produced by variations
in these formulas.61 The burden is on the taxpayer challenging the
fairness of the apportionment formula, on due process grounds, to make
tax oppression manifest by clear and cogent evidence.62 He has carried
that burden, however, when he can successfully show that "in any
aspect of the evidence" the income attributable to the taxing state
by the use of the formula is "out of all appropriate proportion to the
business" transacted by the taxpayer in the taxing state.63 Mathemat-
ical exactness in apportioning, however, is not required of the taxing
state.
64
The United States Supreme Court case of Butler Brothers v. Mc-
Colgan65 sustained a California three-factor formula of property, pay-
rolls, and sales, as applied to an entire multi-state business although
the taxpayer (Butler Brothers) made the contention that a separate
accounting would reveal a loss from California business operations.
The entire operations of Butler Brothers, both within and outside of
California, produced a net profit, and the Court held that the California
operations must be considered as being only a portion of the entire
unitary operations of the business.
In the case at hand, there were several factors indicating that tax-
payer (Dickey) was a unitary operation, rather than multiform, and
that the integrated business need not be taxed on a separate accounting
from the Tennessee plant alone. The expense incident to maintaining
the general offices in Missouri are prorated and allocated among the
manufacturing plants in all the states. A research laboratory for the
benefit of all the plants is operated at and by the central office in
Missouri. The type and kind of equipment installed at the Tennessee
plant was determined on the basis of the experience of the corpora-
tion as a whole. When the Tennessee plant was transferred from a
coal burning unit to a gas burning unit, the capital outlay was borne
from the general assets of the corporation. The manufacturing ex-
periences at all of the plants is available to other plants. The Ten-
61. International Harvester Co. v. Evatt, 329 U.S. 416 (1947); Butler Bros.
v. McColgan, 315 U.S. 501 (1942); Ford Motor Co. v. Beauchamp, 308 U.S.
331 (1939); Bass, Ratcliff & Gretton, Ltd. v. State Tax Comm'n, 266 U.S. 271
(1925); Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113 (1920); Max-
well v. Kent-Coffey Mfg. Co., 204 N.C. 365, 168 S.E. 397 (1933), a]f'd per
curiam, 291 U.S. 642 (1933).
62. See Norfolk & W. Ry. v. North Carolina ex rel. Maxwell, 297 U.S. 682,
688 (1936).
63. Hans Rees' Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina ex rel. Maxwell, 283 U.S. 12a
135 (1931).
64. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Browning, 310 U.S. 362 (1940).
65. 315 U.S. 501 (1942).
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nessee plant maintains two bank accounts. Checks are drawn by this
plant to cover the payrolls, freight charges and miscellaneous pur-
chases. In other instances checks with vouchers attached are for-
warded to the central plant in Missouri, where they are audited and
mailed out. The board of directors of the taxpayer meets monthly
in the Missouri offices and determine the policies of the corporation.
There are other items significantly indicating an integrated, unitary
multi-state enterprise, rather than separate entities, for tax purposes.
The corporation owns a clay pit in Tennessee near that plant. Another
of taxpayer's plants in Alabama uses a substantial quantity of clay
from the Tennessee plant. No profit is credited to the Tennessee plant
for the clay furnished the Alabama plant. The cost of the operation
of the clay pit is shared by the Alabama and Tennessee plants. More-
over, there is no competition among the various plants. Each plant is
given its own exclusive territory for sales. A large fiat discount is
allowed when one plant purchases material from another. The ultimate
control of sales price is with the central office.
In sustaining the tax, the Tennessee Court properly, it seems, up-
held the chancellor who had held that the unity of ownership, the
unity of management, and the unity of the use to a greater or lessor
extent, sustained the right of the state to tax on the basis of an alloca-
tion formula applied to the entire multi-state operations of taxpayer.
There are not sufficient facts in the Court's opinion upon which to
express an opinion whether there were any unusual circumstances
warranting the use of the "hardship" formula rather than the regular
formula that was applied.
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